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1. INTRODUCTION
Crispe v. Perrit (1744), Willes 467 at p. 468, 125 E.R. 1272:
A bankrupt is not considered as an unfortunate person, but as one
who has been guilty of a crime; and therefore in the four first
statutes concerning bankrupts he is frequently called an offender, and
in all of them he is considered as one who has endeavoured by fraud
or collusion to cheat and deceive his creditors and to prevent their
recovering their just and honest debts.
These two stereotypes about bankrupts - the "unfortunate
person" and the "offender" - have populated discussions of
bankruptcy from the time of Henry viln, when the English
Parliament enacted the first bankruptcy law in 1543.' Even the
1706 Act, which first made the discharge available to English
bankrupts, contained a section that made fraudulent bankruptcies
a capital offence.2 In Canada throughout the 1870s, Parliament
debated whether there should be a bankruptcy law at all. Notions
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
** Professor, School of Public Policy and Administration at Carleton University.
f Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Western Ontario.
1. An Act against Such Persons as do Make Bankrupts, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542).
2. An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed by Bankrupts, 4 & 5 Ann. 1, c.
17 (1705); Emily Kadens, "The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in
the Development of Bankruptcy Law" (2010), 59 Duke L.J. 1229.
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of forgiveness competed unsuccessfully with the idea that all
debtors had a moral obligation to repay all debts.3 In the end,
Parliament repealed the Insolvent Act of 1875 in 1880,4 leaving
Canada without any bankruptcy law of general application until
1919.1
The story of bankruptcy reform over the 50-volume lifespan of
the Canadian Business Law Journal is in no small part a story
about these two warring visions of insolvent debtors. Given how
little the Canadian consumer bankruptcy system has changed in
those years, we would judge the war to have arrived at a
stalemate.
We begin this short essay with an analysis of the 1970 Tasse
Report - the first post-war policy review of the consumer
bankruptcy system in Canada - and its continued relevance
today. Next, we provide an account of the most notable change
over the last half century - the vastly different number and
demographic composition of debtors filing for consumer
bankruptcy in Canada. We conclude by highlighting the key
consumer bankruptcy reforms coming out of the most recent and
long-awaited bankruptcy reform period and show how in many
ways, the reforms (and lack of reforms in certain areas) take us
back to a system that more closely resembles the one that a
debtor would have encountered close to half a century ago.
Further, we show that despite the changing demographics of
consumer bankrupts and the enduring relevance of the Tasse
Report nearly a half century later, the Canadian consumer
bankruptcy system continues to resist fully realizing the goals of
consumer rehabilitation and a fresh start, and provides little in
the way of alternatives and accessibility for low-income debtors.
3. See Thomas G.W. Telfer, "Ideas, Interests, Institutions and the History of
Canadian Bankruptcy Law 1867-1880" (2010), 60 U.T.L.J. 603.
4. An Act to repeal the Acts respecting Insolvency now in force in Canada, S.C.
1880, c. 1.
5. The Bankruptcy Act, S.C. 1919, c. 36.
6. lain Ramsay, "Interest Groups and the Politics of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform
in Canada" (2003), 53 U.T.L.J. 379, at p. 403.
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II. THE TASSE REPORT
The plight of the consumer or wage-earner debtor is one of the most
important problems that must be faced in the field of bankruptcy in Canada.
To a certain extent, this group of debtors represents the social and economic
casualties of our industrial and credit system ...
1. Background and Mandate of the Study Committee
The origins of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Legislation (Study Committee) 1970 Report,8 can be
traced to June 19, 1960. On that date, more than 500 credit managers
attended the Canadian Credit Men's Trust Association's 50th
Anniversary Conference in Winnipeg. The theme of the conference
was "Canada's Economy - Credit Manager's Challenge."9 One
item featured prominently on the agenda. 1 The Minister of Justice,
Davie Fulton, spoke to the delegates about possible reforms to the
Bankruptcy Act." The topic would have been of particular
importance to the credit managers in the audience given that many
of them were employed by wholesale firms responsible for granting
credit to retail outlets. According to the Winnipeg Free Press, these
delegates controlled "the purse strings of Canada's largest firms."' 2
Fulton announced that the Ministry of Justice would "launch an
investigation into several sections of Canada's Bankruptcy Act."' 3
Fulton reminded the credit managers that there were many delays in
the bankruptcy system that "made it possible for a debtor to avoid
his commitments by fraudulent means."1 4 He concluded: "These
claims will be investigated, and if found to be substantiated, then a
remedy, possibly on the lines of greater build-in protection for the
creditor, will be found."' 5 Fulton's remarks reflected a growing
7. Canada, Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation, Bank-
ruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Legislation (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1970) (Chair: Roger Tasse)
[Tassd Report], at p. 54.
8. Ibid.
9. "Credit Men Convene for National Meeting," Winnipeg Free Press, June 18,
1960, p. 60.
10. Ibid. The Canadian Credit Men's Trust Association had been one of key interest
groups that pushed for the enactment of The Bankruptcy Act of 1919, supra,
footnote 5. See T. Telfer, "The Canadian Bankruptcy Act of 1919: Public
Legislation or Private Interest?" (1994-1995), 24 C.B.L.J. 357.
11. Bankruptcy Act, 1949, S.C. 1949 (2nd Sess.), c. 7.
12. Supra, footnote 9.
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unease about the increasin number of fraudulent bankruptcies in
the 1950s and early 1960s. 1 This concern, coupled with the growing
worry about the rising number of consumer bankrutcies, led the
government to appoint the Tasse Committee in 1966. By the time
the Study Committee began its work, it had received around 1,200
reform suggestions as a result of Fulton's speech.' 8 Most
submissions represented the credit, business or legal community.
The Study Committee consisted of only four members 20 and was
not meant to be a "committee of inquiry [or] investigation."
However, the Committee had been given broad terms of reference in
that it was asked "to review and report on the bankruptcy and
insolvency legislation of Canada."2 1 Although it originally planned
to recommend amendments to the Bankruptcy Act,2 2 the
Committee realized that a new Act should be proposed because of
the large number of proposed changes.2 3 Bill C-60,24 introduced in
1975, incorporated many of the recommendations of the Tassi
Report.25 When Bill C-60 lapsed, Parliament followed with five
other bills in a nine-year period, but all failed to pass.26
16. Tassd Report, supra, footnote 7, at p. 18; Ramsay, supra, footnote 6, at p. 403. As
a result of these concerns, Parliament enacted amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act in 1966 to widen the investigative powers of the Superintendent of
Bankruptcy. See An Act to amend the Bankruptcy Act, S.C. 1966-67, c. 32.
17. Tassi Report, supra, footnote 7, at p. xi; Personal Insolvency Task Force Final
Report (Ottawa, The Office, 2002) (Y. Goldstein, Chair), at p. 5. Professor
Ramsay notes that by 1971 the number of consumer bankruptcies had exceeded
business bankruptcies. See Ramsay, supra, footnote 6, at p. 403.
18. Tassi Report, ibid.
19. Ibid., at pp. 169-170. Appendix A contains a partial list of organizations that
made written submissions. Organizations included wholesale, retail and credit
associations, Canadian Banker's Association, Chambers of Commerce, Boards of
Trade, and the Canadian Bar Association. Only one debtor organization, the
Debtor's Assistance Board of Alberta, made a submission to the Study
Committee.
20. The members were Roger Tasse (Chairman); John D. Honsberger, Q.C.; Pierre
Carignan, Q.C.; Raymond A. Landry (Secretary). Jacob Ziegel has dubbed this
approach to bankruptcy reform as the "Wise Persons" model. Jacob Ziegel, "The
Modernization of Canadian Bankruptcy Law in a Comparative Context" (1999),
4 Can. Bank. Rev. (4th) 151, at p. 185.
21. Ibid., at p. iii. See also James Baillie, "The Rewriting of Canadian Business
Statutes" (1975-1976), 1 C.B.L.J. 242, at p. 245, note 3.
22. TassS Report, supra, footnote 7, at p. xiii.
23. Ibid.
24. Bill C-60, An Act respecting bankruptcy and insolvency, Ist Sess., 30th Parl.,
1975.
25. Ramsay, supra, footnote 6, at p. 404.
26. See Jacob Ziegel, "The Languishing Bankruptcy Bill" (1982-1983), 7 C.B.L.J.
249; Jacob Ziegel, "The Travails of Bill C-12" (1983-1984), 8 C.B.L.J. 374 [Ziegel,
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2. The Failure of the Study Committee?
Many have suggested possible reasons for why the Tassi Report
did not lead to permanent changes to bankruptcy legislation. The
failure of the reform bills has been attributed to the "significant
number of interest groups opposed to various aspects of the
bankruptcy bills." 2 7 Professor Ramsay's study demonstrates that
"Bill C-60 threatened many influential groups" including banks,
lawyers and accountants. 28 Professor Ziegel, writing in the early
1980s, concluded that the Tasse Report was "written in a much more
affluent and stable economic environment" and "what may have
been an adequate approach in 1970 no longer serves as a sufficient
blueprint for the problems of the 1980s.",29 Although Professor
Ziegel would later recognize "the great scholarship and intellectual
integrity" of the Study Committee, the Tasse Report "ultimately had
a limited impact because the group only included one insolvency
practitioner, and because many of the report's recommendations
were too abstract." 30 Although the Tasse Report did not receive a
warm welcome in 1970, one must ask whether the Study Committee
identified any consumer bankruptcy issues that remain relevant and
unaddressed 40 years later. Does the Tassi Report have a lasting
legacy in 2010?
3. Legacy and Lessons from the Tass6 Report
(a) Consumer Credit and Financial Failure
The Study Committee began by asking whether the principles
underlying the Bankruptcy Act reflected "the needs of our present
society."
We live in an affluent society. It is characterized by mass production, mass
consumption . . . television . . . [and] the two and three car family ...
Accompanying this new affluence have been changing concepts of the
morality of work and debt, new methods of doing business and financing . . .
[and] the advent of the credit card economy ... with the . . . 'buy now, pay
later' . . . living.3 1
"Travails"]; Jacob Ziegel, "Can Canadian Commercial Law be Rehabilitated? An
Introductory Overview" (1992), 20 C.B.L.J. 322, at p. 324.
27. Ramsay, supra, footnote 6, at p. 405.
28. Ibid., at p. 404.
29. Ziegel, "Travails," supra, footnote 26, at p. 375.
30. Ziegel, supra, footnote 20, at p. 185. See also R.C.C. Cuming, "Bill C-60
(Bankruptcy Act, 1975) A Nineteenth Century Approach to Non-Business
Bankruptcy" (1975-1976), 1 C.B.L.J. 459, at pp. 459-460.
31. Tassi Report, supra, footnote 7, at pp. 51-52.
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These fundamental changes to society "made much of our
legislation obsolete." 32 The Study Committee noted that since
World War II, "the explosive use of credit, particularly consumer
credit" had "put the bankruptcy system out of balance." 33 In
Canadian society, "the producer or manufacturing organizations
make vast investments in .. .advertising aimed at creating a demand
to buy more." 34 Through the "endless stream of persuasion" of
media and the mail, the consumer is "exhorted . . . to become
indebted."3  According to the Study Committee, "those who should
most strongly resist this pressure are those who are the least
educationally, intellectually and culturally prepared to withstand
the pressure." 36 These broader concerns raised by the Study
Committee are far more relevant today than they were in 1970.
The Study Committee's recognition of the link between the
explosion in consumer credit and debt was significant for 1970.
However, today new forms of consumer credit, such as payday loans
and debit cards linked to overdraft facilities, have emerged along
with the proliferation of new types of credit cards and home equity
loans.37 In short, the problem identified in 1970 has only worsened.
Although not emphasized by the Tasse Committee, greater
consumer debt need not be a problem if income and wealth are
rising as well. For example, the median amount of consumer debt in
the 2005 Survey of Financial Security was $44,500, an increase of
37.8% over the 1999 value of $32,300 (in 2005 dollars). However, the
ratio of consumer debts to consumer assets increased by only 3.5%
from $13.06 in debt for every $100 in assets to $13.52 per $100 in
assets.38 The greater problem today may be the distribution of
consumer debt across income brackets if, as discussed below, lenders
have increasingly focused on "marginal or submarginal risks."
32. Ibid., at p. 81.
33. Ibid., at p. 53.
34. Ibid., at p. 54.
35. Ibid., at p. 53.
36. Ibid., at p. 54.
37. On the evolution of consumer credit see Jacob Ziegel, "Consumer Insolvencies,
Consumer Credit, and Responsible Lending," in Janis Sarra, ed., Annual Review
of Insolvency Law, 2009 (Toronto, Carswell, 2010), at pp. 361-370. On the link
between credit cards and consumer bankruptcy see lain Ramsay, "Consumer
Credit Society and Consumer Bankruptcy: Reflections on Credit Cards and
Bankruptcy in the Informational Economy," in Johanna Niemi-Kiesildinen, lain
Ramsay and William Whitford, eds., Consumer Bankruptcy in Global Perspective
(Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2003), at p. 17.
38. These numbers from the Survey of Financial Security are reported in Statistics
Canada, The Wealth of Canadians: An Overview of the Results of the Survey of
Financial Security (Ottawa, Minister of Industry, 2006), at pp. 18-19.
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(b) Social Impact of Consumer Credit
The Study Committee's picture of the consequences of consumer
credit still resonates today. Consumer debtors found themselves "in
a trap from which they cannot escape." "Bad fortune" often led to
one "financial emergency following another." These factors
combined with mismanagement led debtors to "become deeper
and more hopelessly in debt."39
At the heart of this debt cycle was a "personal tragedy" that had
wider implications:
There is much personal tragedy for those who become hopelessly in debt.
Each case involves a person who has failed, a person who has been defeated.
The failure and defeat not only affect the debtor, but his wife, family, friends
and acquaintances. Many children, to escape a harsh, bleak and degrading
environment, marry young and become themselves a member of the chronic
poor.4 0
Quoting from the 1967 Senate and House of Commons Report on
Consumer Credit, the Study Committee recognized the social cost of
over-burdened debtors: "The tensions built up in harassed
individuals and families frequently contribute to familV
breakdown, mental illness, crime and economic dependency."
The Tassi Report's conclusions point to a broader research agenda
that moves beyond the specific study of consumer bankruptcies per
se. The social implications of the growing burden on debtors
resulting from consumer credit deserve even more scrutiny 40 years
after the issuance of the Tassi Report.
(c) Debtor and Creditor Responsibility
Although the Study Committee recognized the plight of heavily
indebted debtors, it did not refrain from pointing out that "some
debtors, with loose moral standards or not personally affected by the
stigma that ... attaches to bankruptcy, may abuse credit facilities." 42
In line with Minister Fulton's concern in 1960, the Tasse Report
acknowledged that fraudulent conduct on the part of debtors had to
be addressed.43 However, debtor fraud was not the sole focus of the
39. Tasse Report, supra, footnote 7, at p. 54.
40. Ibid., at p. 54.
41. Canada, Parliament, Special Joint Committee on Consumer Credit (Prices),
Report on Consumer Credit of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the
House of Commons on Consumer Credit and Cost of Living (Ottawa, Queen's
Printer, 1967) (Chairs: D.A. Kroll and R. Basford), at p. 58.
42. Tasse Report, supra, footnote 7, at p. 53.
43. Ibid., at p. 60.
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Tasse Report. The Study Committee also recognized that "[a]s there
are good and bad debtors, so are there good and bad creditors."4 4
According to the Study Committee, the traditional maxim of equal
treatment of all unsecured creditors needed re-examination.4 5 While
the Tassi Report never fully explains under what circumstances the
equitable treatment of creditors would be disturbed, it nevertheless
condemned the change in lending transactions. Traditionally,
lenders would advance funds:
after a careful consideration of the capacity of the borrower or purchaser to
fulfill his obligation. This is often not the case. Some producers may choose
to operate closer to full capacity in order to lower their costs and, to dispose
of their production, may deliberately extend credit to the marginal or sub-
marginal risks. The same may be true of wholesalers, retailers and finance
46institutions who may attempt to increase their volume of business . . .
Today, the growth of payday lending and the fallout from the
U.S. subprime mortgage crisis demonstrate that there has been a
continued growth in the deliberate extension of credit to "marginal
or sub-marginal"4 7 risks (i.e., people who may not be able to
repay). However, modern lending practices have encompassed a
new phenomenon. Targeting low-income debtors has become a
significant part of the credit industry. Even though the debtor may
not be able to repay the debt, the fees, penalties and interest charges
make this category of debtor a profitable one and a good risk for
the lender to assume. 4 8 The development of credit scoring
techniques has permitted credit card issuers to "target consumers
who are likely to generate high profits through late payments and
borrowing on a card." 4 9 Further, the Study Committee's concern
that some creditors extended credit without careful consideration
has given rise to the notion today that creditors should be held
accountable for irresponsible lending. For example, Professor
Ziegel has proposed that where there is an improvident extension of
44. Ibid., at p. 54.
45. Ibid., at p. 54.
46. Ibid., at p. 53 (Emphasis added).
47. Ibid., at p. 53.
48. Ziegel, supra, footnote 37, at p. 373. See also Ronald J. Mann, "Patterns of
Credit Card Use Among Low- and Moderate-Income Households," in Rebecca
M. Blank and Michael S. Barr, eds., Insufficient Funds: Savings, Assets, Credit
and Banking Among Low-Income Households (New York, Russel Sage Founda-
tion, 2009), p. 257.
49. lain Ramsay and Toni Williams, "The Crash that Launched a Thousand Fixes:
Regulation of Consumer Credit After the Lending Revolution and the Credit
Crunch," working paper (Kent Law School, University of Kent, 2009), at p. 9,
online: SRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1474036>.
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credit, the trustee in bankruptcy should be given the power to deny
these unconscionable creditor claims under the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act 50 (BIA). Such an unconscionable claim would be
defined in part as where the "creditor knew, or should reasonably
have anticipated, that the debtor would not be able to meet . .. the
debtor's obligations under the credit contract."5 1 However, the
concept of an improvident extension of credit and an
unconscionable claim in the bankruptcy would have to deal with
the emergence of securitization of various debt obligations. The
ultimate holder of the debt in the bankruptcy, for example, may be
a pension fund holding a package of mortgage or credit card
accounts. As the last holder of the debt, it would have had nothing
to with the originating loan. The improvident extension of credit
would have been made much earlier in the chain of transactions by
the originator.
(d) Fresh Start
The Study Committee acknowledged that the objective of
bankruptcy law should be to "rehabilitate" the debtor and "give
him an opportunity to make a fresh economic start in life." 52 This
objective has been a significant feature of the legislation and has long
been recognized by the judicial branch. However, an important
aspect of the fresh start is ready access to the bankruptcy regime. The
Study Committee concluded that relief for the consumer debtor was
"not effective or illusory . .. [B]ankruptcy is financially beyond the
reach of those who most need it." 5 4 According to the Study
Committee, bankruptcy "should be equally available, as a last resort
to financial disaster, to all debtors whether in business or not."5 5
50. R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
51. Ziegel, supra, footnote 37, at p. 392.
52. Tasse Report, supra, footnote 7, at p. 87.
53. Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Lalonde, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 109, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 348;
Canadian Bankers' Assn. v. Saskatchewan (Attorney General); The Moratorium
Act (Sask.) (Re), [195515 D.L.R. 736, 1956] S.C.R. 31. See also (In re), Exparte
Painter (Ex p.), [1895] I Q.B. 85 at p. 88, 11 T.L.R. 9 (Div. Ct.); Williams v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915), at pp. 554-555; Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934), at p. 244. On the evolution of the fresh start see
Stephanie Ben-Ishai, "Discharge" in Stephanie Ben-lshai and Anthony Duggan,
eds., Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: Bill C-55, Statute c. 47 and
Beyond (Markham, LexisNexis, 2007), p. 357.
54. Tasse Report, supra, footnote 7, at pp. 54 and 65.
55. Ibid., at p. 86.
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A recent study by Professors Ben-Ishai and Saul Schwartz
demonstrates that affordable access to a bankruptcy system may
still remain a significant problem.56
In recent years, the rehabilitative purpose of bankruptcy law has
been further eroded by statutory amendments. Legislative changes
to the BIA have moved the law away from rehabilitation as the
underlying theory for the discharge. 57 Straight bankruptcy followed
by a discharge and debtor rehabilitation has been made more
difficult. Debtors are required to meet surplus income requirements
and some debtors with surplus income may have to remain bankrupt
for a longer period. Stephanie Ben-Ishai suggested that the 1997
amendments "signalled a return to the 'debtor deviant' construct"
and the more recent 2005 and 2007 amendments "hold the potential
to entrench this construct in Canada's consumer bankruptcy
system."5 8
Arguably, one of the most important legacies of the Tasse
Report was its proposal to introduce consumer proposals as an
alternative to bankruptcy.6 0 A "watered down" 61 version of that
recommendation ultimately appeared in the BIA in 1992. By 1997,
accessibility to the discharge and a fresh start became inherently
linked to proposals. Under the BIA, the court may refuse, suspend or
grant a conditional discharge when "the bankrupt, if the bankrupt
could have made a viable proposal, chose bankruptcy rather than a
proposal to creditors as the means to resolve the indebtedness." 62 No
such recommendation appeared in the Tassi Report as no doubt the
Study Committee would have considered such a provision to
undermine the concept of a fresh start.
The 40 years that have elapsed since the release of the report
demonstrate that many of the key findings of the Study Committee
continue to remain relevant for consumer debtors. Indeed, many of
56. Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Saul Schwartz, "Bankruptcy for the Poor?" (2007), 45
Osgoode Hall L.J. 471.
57. On the 1997 amendments see Thomas Telfer, "Access to the Discharge in
Canadian Bankruptcy Law and the New Role of Surplus Income: A Historical
Perspective," in Charles E.F. Rickett and Thomas G.W. Telfer, eds., Interna-
tional Perspectives on Consumers' Access to Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2003), p. 231. On the 2005 and 2007 amendments see Ben-Ishai,
supra, footnote 53.
58. Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 53, at pp. 357-358.
59. Ramsay, supra, footnote 6, at p. 407 ("The introduction of consumer proposals
reflected the historical legacy of the Tasse Report.").
60. Tassi Report, supra, footnote 7, at p. 91.
61. Ramsay, supra, footnote 6, at p. 408. Ramsay notes that by 1992 "a consumer
proposal did not affect the rights of secured creditors."
62. BIA, s. 173(n).
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the problems for debtors identified in 1970 have been exacerbated by
the unrelenting growth of consumer credit. Further, the prospects
for a fresh start, a key component of bankruptcy law identified in the
Report, have been weakened. Although the Study Committee did
not provide any empirical evidence or interviews with bankrupts to
support its conclusions, the Report provides us with a benchmark in
time against which to measure the current plight of consumer
bankrupts. The empirical story is the subject of Part III.
III. THE CONSUMER BANKRUPT 40 YEARS LATER:
AN EMPIRICAL ACCOUNT
In the early 1970s, shortly after the Tass& Report was released,
there were fewer than 5,000 consumer bankruptcies and no
consumer proposals. In the 12-month period ending April 30,
2010, there were 109,924 consumer bankruptcies and another 38,717
consumer proposals.6 3
One reality of contemporary societies is that debt is an integral
and accepted feature of the economic lives of consumers. Another
reality is that many consumers cannot or do not repay their debts as
they come due. The simple division of insolvent debtors into the
"honest but unfortunate" on the one hand and the "deviant" on the
other does not describe such a complex reality. An "honest but
unfortunate" debtor might not have been as careful as she should
have been while her life was going well and ended up with large
outstanding debts when adverse life events occurred. The "deviant"
bankrupt might have been driven to strategic behaviour only after
adverse life events set her on a downward spiral.
Nonetheless, one aspect of the power of such simple either-or
stories is their resistance to empirical investigation. Such empirical
investigations try to ascertain how actual bankruptcy cases are
distributed along the spectrum from "honest but unfortunate" to
"deviant." The research can be qualitative, collecting the stories of
those who have filed for bankruptcy, or quantitative, seeking to infer
63. Historical statistics for the number of consumer bankruptcies are available from
the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Industry Canada, "Overview of
Canadian Insolvency Statistics up to 2006" (Ottawa, Industry Canada, 2007),
online: Industry Canada <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/
br01770.html#graphlO>, showing a line graph of the annual number of
consumer insolvencies from 1968 to the present. For more current information,
see the tables at Industry Canada, "Insolvency Statistics in Canada", Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy (Ottawa, Industry Canada), online: Industry
Canada <http://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/hbrO1 ll .html> sum-
marizing recent insolvency statistics.
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the nature of the bankrupts from economic and demographic
information. The ultimate causes of any bankruptcy, however,
cannot be determined without ambiguity. For example, is the
ultimate cause the fact of borrowing in the first place, when perhaps
the debtor might have managed without borrowing? Is the ultimate
cause "job loss" when the debtor had run up large debts prior to
losing her job? Is the ultimate cause "mismanagement" when
expenses were incurred to give children opportunities similar to their
peers? Recognizing the difficulty of arriving at a true picture, we can
review the empirical investigations of Canadian bankrupts.
The last comprehensive, quantitative examination of Canadian
bankrupts dates back to 1997 when, on behalf of the federal Office of
Consumer Affairs, Professors Saul Schwartz and Leigh Anderson
conducted a survey of about 1,000 debtors filing for bankruptcy. 64
Twenty years earlier, in 1977, Brighton and Connidis had also
studied a sample of bankrupts.6 5 For our purposes, the relevance of
the Schwartz and Anderson survey is in one of its conclusions:
... the economic situation of those who sought bankruptcy protection in
1997 was quite weak. This is evidence against arguments that the bankruptcy
laws are widely used by economically healthy individuals who simply want
to avoid paying legitimate debts.6 6
Overall, the Schwartz and Anderson survey revealed that the
economic situation of debtors filing for bankruptcy in 1997 was
similar to that of debtors filing in 1977, even though their numbers
were far larger. This is not to say that the samples were similar
demographically. The proportion of women filing for bankruptcy in
1997, for example, was far higher than it had been in 1977, likely
reflecting more equal access to credit and higher divorce rates.
Looking at the debtors' reports of their 1996 pre-tax annual
income, their occupation and their receipt of government transfers,
Schwartz summarized the situation by concluding that ". . . it seems
that individuals seeking bankruptcy protection in 1997 were not
much different from those who declared bankruptcy in 1977. They
were in severe economic straits, with low incomes, poor job
prospects, and a history of social assistance or unemployment
insurance receipt."67
64. Saul Schwartz, "The Empirical Dimensions of Consumer Bankruptcy: Results
From a Survey of Canadian Bankrupts" (1999), 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 83.
65. J.W. Brighton and J.A. Connidis, Consumer Bankrupts in Canada (Ottawa,
Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1982).
66. Ibid., at p. 85.
67. Ibid., at p. 107. The Schwartz and Anderson survey had two sources of income
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A more recent analysis of Canadian bankruptcy data, by Redish,
Sarra and Schabas6 1 (2006), is limited to a subset of those filing for
bankruptcy who were age 55 or older. Redish et al. note that " . . .
15.3% of all individual bankrupts in Canada were over age 55 in
2003. In 1993 this figure was 6.9%.",69 As they point out, the rise in
the proportion of older people filing for bankruptcy is
counterintuitive because one would think that spending patterns
and lifestyles are determined well before age 55, so that large
changes are unlikely to occur. Redish et al. went into their study
thinking that perhaps "new temptations," in the form of more
accessible gambling opportunities or the rise of television (and on-
line) shopping might have had an influence. Or, they speculated,
there might have been a rise in the number of adult children needing
significant amounts of financial help from their parents. However,
none of these potential causes of bankruptcy showed up in large
numbers in their analysis and the causes that did appear were quite
similar to those characterizing the bankruptcies of younger people.
The one exception was the understandably greater importance of
"medical reasons" as a cause of bankruptcy.
Although the U.S. and Canadian bankruptcy laws are different in
important ways, the similarity in the two economies might suggest
that American bankrupts are similar to Canadian bankrupts. The
Consumer Bankruptcy Project in the United States70 has completed
three profiles of American bankrupts, in 1991, 2001 and 2007. A
detailed comparison of the 1997 Schwartz and Anderson data and
the Consumer Bankruptcy Project data is beyond the scope of this
paper but, generally speaking, the profiles are similar - in both
countries, bankrupts are typically those who are working and who
have relatively low income.
Interestingly, the distribution of income among bankrupts in the
United States was about the same in 2007 as it had been in 2001.
information. The first was derived from the bankrupts' statements of affairs and
represents "net monthly income" at the time of filing. The second was derived
from the survey that accompanied the statement of affairs and represents annual
pre-tax household income in 1996, the year before the bankruptcy filings.
68. Angela Redish, Janis Sarra and Margaret Schabas, "Growing Old Gracefully, An
Investigation into the Growing Number of Bankrupt Canadians over age 55"
(Ottawa, Office of the Superintendant of Bankruptcy Research Project, 2006),
online: Industry Canada <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/
br01683.html>.
69. Ibid., at p. 9.
70. For a list of papers associated with the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, see online:
Bankruptcy Data Project at Harvard University <http://bdp.law.harvard.edu/
fellows.cfm>.
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Because the 2005 U.S. bankruptcy reform was driven by a stated
desire to discourage high-income debtors from filing, one might
have thought that the median income of filers would have fallen
from 2001 to 2007. The number of American bankruptcies dropped
considerably between 2005 and 2007, but the median income of the
bankrupts did not, suggesting that the reform discouraged
bankruptcies across the spectrum of incomes.7 1 As will be shown
in the next section, the recent Canadian bankruptcy reform was also
aimed at discouraging "can pay" debtors from filing for bankruptcy
and receiving a quick discharge. It would be useful to undertake a
follow-up study of Canadian bankrupts to see if the changes had the
desired effects; the 1997 Schwartz and Anderson study is now quite
dated and a newer profile would be of great value.
IV. THE 2009 REFORMS: A STEP BACK?72
1. Middle-Class Debtors and the Deviant Debtor Construct
A key component of consumer bankruptcy in Canada has, since
1919, been the non-waivable or mandatory consumer bankruptcy
discharge. As recognized in the Tassi Report, bankruptcy's non-
waivable discharge has in recent times been regarded as part of
economic rehabilitation of the debtor, which is equated with a "fresh
start." However, the amendments to consumer bankruptcy
legislation since the Tassi Report have for the most part moved
away from the fresh start goal and understanding of consumer
bankruptcy. A clear example are the 1997 amendments that
attempted to effect a move from rehabilitation of the debtor to
asking debtors to rehabilitate their debts by making payments out of
surplus income. 73 The 1997 amendments required trustees to assess
whether bankrupts could have made a viable consumer proposal and
whether they co-operated with the trustee by meeting any surplus
income requirements. 74
Despite the underlying assumption that many bankrupts have an
ability to make repayments to creditors, in practice, these
amendments had a limited impact on the majority of bankrupts
who could not make a proposal because they did not have surplus
71. Robert M. Lawless, John Pottow, et al., "Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors" (2008), 82 Am. Bankr. L.J. 349, at pp.
349-405.
72. This section summarizes in part sections from Chapters 13 and 14 of Ben-lshai
and Duggan, supra, footnote 53.
73. Telfer, supra, footnote 57.
74. Ibid.
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income. As discussed earlier, while the 1997 BIA amendments had
limited practical impact, they signalled a return to the "deviant
debtor" construct, which positions bankruptcy law as a response to
deviant behaviour. The 2009 reforms further entrench this construct
in Canada's consumer bankruptcy system and also establish the
"middle class" user of the system. The 2009 consumer bankruptcy
reforms largely respond to the needs and problems experienced by
the existing users of the system - that is the middle-class or close-to-
middle-class debtor and her creditors - and on this basis reflect and
expand on the status quo. Three examples illustrate this point: the
exclusion of RRSPs and RRIFS from property of the bankrupt, the
longer bankruptcy periods for surplus income earners, and the
treatment of bankrupts with high income tax debt.
(a) RRSPs and RRIFs
The protection of RRSPs and RRIFs (tax-sheltered retirement
savings plans) provided by provincial law is restored by the 2009
reforms, such that they do not become property of the bankrupt
divisible among his or her creditors.7 5 Where RRSPs and RRIFs are not
protected by provincial law, they will be afforded protection under
the BIA. 76 An exception is provided for any contributions made in the
12 months preceding bankruptcy. Such contributions are not
excluded from property of the bankrupt divisible among his or her
creditors.
This reform is based on the reality that Canadians are increasingly
being called upon to provide for their own retirement, as private
pensions are less often offered by employers and the government
provides for older Canadians only in a limited way. Further, as the
earlier section demonstrated, older Canadians are increasingly
represented among the bankrupt population. Accordingly, in order
for the bankruptcy system to truly provide a fresh start, and to
ensure that older Canadians do not find themselves right back in the
bankruptcy system, this reform attempts to provide some protection
for debtors' retirement savings.
One limitation of this reform is that many Canadians have neither
RRSPS nor RRIFS. 7 7 Of those that do, relatively few have employer-
75. BIA, at s. 67(l)(b.3).
76. Ibid.
77. In the 2005 Survey of Financial Security, 71% of Canadians say they have
"pension assets" and 58% had RRSPS, RRIFS or deferred profit sharing plans. This
figure has likely dropped significantly since this last set of publicly available
figures.
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provided pensions. However, the majority of over-indebted
Canadians have neither retirement plans nor retirement savings.
Accordingly, these reforms provide little assistance to them.
(b) Longer Bankruptcy Periods
For most Canadian debtors, bankruptcy is a simple nine-month
process that can be handled electronically by a bankruptcy trustee.
When a consumer assigns herself into bankruptcy, there is an
automatic stay that stops collection efforts (such as telephone calls
and letters demanding repayment) by her unsecured creditors.
Following an assignment into bankruptcy, all of the bankrupt's non-
exempt property vests in the bankruptcy trustee to be sold for the
benefit of her creditors. If the bankrupt earns an income above the
surplus income threshold provided for in the Office of the
Superintendent in Bankruptcy Directives, she will be required to
make surplus income payments to the trustee.7 8 Following the 2009
amendments, bankrupts with surplus income are now required to
wait for the expiration of a 21-month period before becoming
eligible for an automatic discharge. 79 During this period they must
continue to make surplus income payments to the bankruptcy
trustee.80 Second-time bankrupts are entitled to an automatic
discharge following the expiration of a 24-month period."' If a
second-time bankrupt has surplus income, she must wait for the
expiration of a 36-month period. The second time bankrupt must
make surplus income payments to the trustee during this period.82
In practice, many Canadian consumer bankrupts have little or no
non-exempt property to be distributed among their unsecured
creditors and earn incomes below the surplus income threshold.
Accordingly, the reforms to the automatic discharge will only affect
a small number of debtors. The reforms seek to increase the
availability of the automatic discharge (to second time bankrupts),
while at the same time increasing for some debtors the period of time
before eligibility for an automatic discharge.
The Canadian reforms stand in contrast to the most recent
American reforms - a central feature of which was means-testing.
Means-testing requires all debtors to calculate their estimated ability
to pay (according to complex formulae) and to file these calculations
78. BIA, at s.168.1 and Forms 65, 82 and 84 and Directive No.1 1R2.
79. Ibid., at s.168.1(b).
80. Ibid., at s. 168.1 and Forms 65, 82 and 84 and Directive No.11 R2.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
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with their Chapter 783 petitions.84 A failure to do so results in
automatic dismissal of their petition. In contrast, the Canadian
approach is to focus on means-measurement. That is, for liquidation
bankruptcies, the bankruptcy trustee, on the basis of regulations set
by the Office of the Superintendent in Bankruptcy, sets the amount
debtors are required to pay (if any) during the bankruptcy period.
For debtors who are required to pay under the current means-
measurement tests - that is, those who are required to make surplus
income payments - the reforms will increase the period of
repayment. The reforms do not seek to introduce means-testing
into the Canadian system. Means-testing and means-measuring
serve different purposes under the American and Canadian regimes.
Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 8 6 the purpose of means-testing is to deny
debtors relief if they fail the test, while in Canada the object of
means-measurement is to ensure that the surplus income received by
the bankrupt during the bankruptcy period is made available to the
estate. Paradoxically, the Canadian means-measurement approach
is more effective at putting into action the key objective set out by the
proponents of means-testing in the United States than the United
States system itself. That is, means-measurement focuses
specifically on "can pay" or so-called "undeserving" debtors and
imposes a tax on them for the privilege of escaping their
commitments. At the same time, because Canadian debtors with
surplus income are still able to move through the bankruptcy
process, they are not directly prevented from accessing the fresh start
offered by a liquidation bankruptcy.
With respect to the claim that means-testing, by increasing the
likelihood of repayment of debts, decreases the cost of borrowing, it
is questionable whether means-measurement will achieve this
objective. Even though surplus payments have historically had
only a trivial impact on disbursements to creditors, this may change
with the introduction of the longer payment. In addition, by
imposing a longer payment period for debtors with surplus income,
it is likely that a larger number will turn to consumer proposals. At
the same time, the greater flexibility offered by the current Canadian
approach allows debtors with a modest surplus income to make
payments for a relatively short period, and to earn their discharge
83. Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (Bankruptcy), Chapter 7.
84. See Stephanie Ben-Ishai, "Means Testing," in Ben-Ishai and Duggan, supra,
footnote 53, p. 343.
85. Telfer, supra, footnote 57.
86. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
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without forcing them into making unrealistic consumer proposals.
As the longer payment periods apply equally to debtors regardless of
the amount of their surplus payments, debtors with low income may
turn to consumer proposals, which they are unable to complete
successfully. It will be important to monitor whether the number of
consumer proposals increases with the enactment of the reforms,
and the success rate of these proposals.
A key issue in the American consideration of means-testing - the
use of discretion - is also at the heart of the Canadian reforms.
Similar to the American concern with the use of judicial discretion
and the resulting lack of uniformity, a concern existed with respect to
the trustee's use of discretion in extending the surplus payment
period. The Personal Insolvency Task Force Report (PITE) states that
"[t]he discretion afforded to trustees allows debtors to 'shop' for a
trustee who will not require any additional payments," 87 creating a
situation in which the imposition of shorter payment periods would
result in a personal gain for trustees. The use of bright line rules for
the repayment period minimizes the ability of debtors to choose
trustees on the basis of their position on repayment periods and
introduces a more standardized approach. At the same time, there
remains a degree of discretion left to trustees in applying the directive
to the debtor's specific financial situation, determining if surplus
payments are required and, if so, in what amount. Arguably, this
aspect of the Canadian system retains the "human side of the law"
that has been lost in the American approach to bright line means-
testing. In addition, a comprehensive mediation process is in place to
address situations where the debtor and the trustee cannot agree. Of
course, to the extent that some level of discretion is preserved for
trustees, there remains anxiety around uniformity with regard to
surplus payment amounts.
(c) High Income Tax Debtors
For bankrupts with more than $200,000 (including principal,
interest and penalties) in personal income tax debt (federal and/or
provincial), representing 75% or more of their total unsecured
proven claims, an application for discharge is now required by the
2009 reforms.88 For first and second-time bankrupts, such an
application may be made when the bankrupt would have been
87. Personal Insolvency Task Force Final Report, supra, footnote 17, at p. 45.
88. BIA, at s. 172.1.
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eligible for an automatic discharge.89 For all other bankrupts, the
hearing may not be heard until 36 months have expired.90
The court may refuse the discharge, suspend the discharge, or
provide a conditional discharge. The burden is on the bankrupt to
justify the relief requested and the court is directed to take into
account:
(i) The bankrupt's circumstances at the time the personal
income tax debt was incurred;
(ii) the efforts made by the bankrupt to pay the personal
income tax;
(iii) whether the bankrupt paid other debts while failing to make
reasonable efforts to pay the personal income tax debt; and
(iv) the bankrupt's financial prospects for the future.
A discharge order may be modified after one year.91
The reforms to the treatment of one form of government debt -
income tax debt - stand in contrast with the reforms to another
form of government debt - government-funded student loan
debt.92 Since 1998, government-funded student loans incurred
within the 10-year period prior to the bankruptcy date have
formed an exception to discharge. The 2009 reforms shorten this
period and modify the process for discharging these loans.
In general, the reforms soften the treatment of student loan debt
in some respects, but leave the basic scheme untouched. The 10-year
"waiting period" has been reduced to seven years. In addition,
bankrupts may make an application, after five years, for relief on
hardship grounds. 93 Moreover, bankrupts who have non-
dischargeable student loans at the time of bankruptcy (i.e., those
who were in school less than seven years prior to the date of
bankruptcy) are entitled to make an application for discharge of
these student loans after the seven years have elapsed. However,
debtors must make a costly discharge or relief application in these
cases and may have limited access to assistance in handling the




92. By "government-funded student loans", we mean the loans that are defined in s.
178(1)g of the BIA:
(g) any debt or obligation in respect of a loan made under the Canada Student Loans
Act, the Canada Student Financial Assistance Act or any enactment of a province that
provides for loans or guarantees of loans to students.
93. BIA, s. 178.
94. Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors
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recommendations, there is no provision for partial relief; and most
importantly, there is no empirically-based rationale for excepting
student loans from the discharge. In addition, the statute provides
little direction to the courts in the exercise of their discretion in
hardship applications.
The introduction of a special discharge procedure for tax debts
meets one criticism of the student loan provisions: previously
government-funded student loans were the only form of government
debt excepted from the discharge. Now tax debts will also be
excepted in certain circumstances. However, this is where the
consistency ends. A student loan debtor will be unable to apply for
discharge of the debt until at least five years after ceasing to be a
student, whereas a tax debtor can apply for a discharge as early as
nine months after filing for bankruptcy. In addition, the statute
provides a specific list of factors to be taken into account at the tax
debtor's discharge hearing. Furthermore, while an absolute
discharge cannot be granted, a suspended or conditional discharge
may be granted with some measure of partial relief. Unlike the
majority of student loan debtors, many tax debtors that fit within
these provisions will have the resources to engage counsel to
represent them at the discharge hearing and assist them in obtaining
partial relief.
Taken together, the treatment of debts owed to the government
push at the rehabilitation model of consumer bankruptcy without a
clear or principled underpinning. Historically, the small list of
exceptions to the discharge in bankruptcy was consistent with the
position that where the bankrupt acts in good faith, she is entitled to
the discharge. This is the case even where the bankruptcy is the result
of poor financial decisions. Accordingly, by excepting student loan
debt and tax debt, the legislature characterizes bankrupts with this
type of debt as deviant and dishonest. Student loan debtors are the
most deviant, while tax debtors deserve a symbolic slap on the wrist.
By contrast, other bankrupts, such as those who owe fines imposed
by a court and damage awards arising from civil proceedings other
than for bodily harm, sexual assault, or wrongful death, remain
entitled to have those debts discharged. In addition, both measures
and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Ottawa, The Committee, 2003)
(Chair: R.H. Kroft), online: Industry Canada <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/app/oca/
crd/dcmnt.do?id = 1880&lang = eng>.
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run counter to the bankruptcy policy, in place since 1992, that the
Crown should not be afforded special treatment in bankruptcy.9 5
2. Missed Opportunities
Arguably, making bankruptcy harder for a small group of high-
income bankrupts does not detract from the possibility of realizing
the fresh start objective underlying the Canadian bankruptcy
system. However, the reforms are a further example of a missed
opportunity to take up the challenge articulated in the Tasse Report
- one adopted in countries around the world - to provide
accessible bankruptcy options to low-income and no-income
debtors. Two examples illustrate this point - the continued use of
registrars and the lack of a public or low-cost bankruptcy option.
(a) Court Hearings
Most consumer bankruptcy cases in Canada result in automatic
discharge and there is no court hearing. Nevertheless, there are still a
substantial number of debtors involved in hearings. The reforms
remove the need for a court hearing in the case of second-time
bankrupts, impose a hearing on tax debtors, create an incentive and
a more accessible vehicle for creditors to oppose a discharge (which
will result in a discharge hearing), and retain the possibility for an
application for relief from the exception to discharge for student
loans. It is unclear whether the reforms will result in a net increase or
decrease in the number of court hearings.
In any event, in each of these instances, the court is instructed to
use its judicial discretion in different ways, and different controls
operate in the discharge process without clear policy rationales. For
example, in the case of student loan debt, the legislation gives the
court very little guidance in the exercise of its discretion to grant
relief. By contrast, in the case of tax debt, the new provisions set out a
detailed list of factors the court must consider in ruling on an
application for a discharge. For oppositions to discharge in all other
instances, the court is given a list of factors on the basis of which it
may refuse or suspend the discharge or impose conditions. This list
differs from the list provided for tax debtors.
The reforms overlook a key issue, namely the role and form that
dispute resolution should take with respect to the consumer
bankruptcy discharge. More particularly, should the hearing
95. Stephanie Ben-ishai, "Technically the King Can Do Wrong in Reorganizing
Insolvent Corporations: Evidence from Canada" (2004), 13 Intl. Insol. Rev. 115.
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continue to play a role in the discharge process, and if so, what
principles should guide the process?
(b) Low-Cost Bankruptcy Option
The discussion in the earlier section on means-measuring versus
means-testing offered a positive perspective on how the reforms
contribute to a fresh start for high-income debtors. The focus was on
debtors who are currently able to access the bankruptcy system and
how this will change with the enactment of the reforms. Unlike the
American system, the Canadian surplus payment requirements do
not impose additional front-end administrative and financial
burdens that in themselves will prevent the poorest of potential
bankrupts from accessing the bankruptcy system. However, a
number of obstacles hinder access to the bankruptcy process for the
poorest debtors. In particular, such debtors will have difficulty
paying the trustee in bankruptcy approximately $1,800 in costs
associated with the administration of a bankruptcy. The reforms go
some way to address this concern by providing a mechanism for the
bankrupt to reach an agreement with the trustee to continue paying
for bankruptcy services after the bankruptcy period .96 However, this
agreement itself stands in the way of a "true" fresh start. The 2009
reforms represent yet another missed opportunity to establish a low-
cost bankruptcy option for poor debtors.
V. CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD TO 2050
The 2009 Canadian bankruptcy law reforms discussed in this
article, while offering some additional support to middle and high-
income debtors, by way of enabling them to pay a surplus for a
period and still have access to a fresh start, do not go far enough to
address the needs of low-income debtors - the most vulnerable
debtor group. Low-income debtors, in contrast to their wealthier
counterparts, face many obstacles when attempting to engage with
the bankruptcy system, the first of which is the $1,800 fee required to
initiate the process. Other difficulties that low-income debtors face
are exacerbated by the shift in attitude that underpins the recent law
reform: debtors have come to be seen less as "unfortunates" and
more as "deviants" in need of punishment. This has been a constant
theme in the history of bankruptcy law reform. In our current
culture, where credit is easily and widely available, this change in
attitude puts low-income debtors at a double disadvantage: less able
96. BIA, at s. 156.1.
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than their more affluent and educated peers to avoid bad credit, they
become punching bags for the bankruptcy system in general.
Though actual prison sentences are no longer doled out to poor
debtors, the bankruptcy and credit system currently in existence has
a tendency to metaphorically imprison low-income individuals. A
classic illustration of this would be how agreements to pay the
trustee's fees after the bankruptcy period ends directly impede the
bankrupt from acquiring a true "fresh start."
The 2009 law reforms also run counter to previously accepted
concepts, the most important of which is that unsecured creditors,
including the Crown, are to be treated equally. The Crown's
preferential treatment can be seen in the way that tax debts are now
being treated. Obligations to make partial payments of tax debts
constitute the "slap on the wrist" to debtors; these same obligations
to pay also run counter to the availability of complete discharge that
is present with other debts. The treatment of student loans further
bolsters our argument that the Crown continues to be accorded
special treatment; the waiting time for discharge of student debts
puts a heavier obligation on bankrupts to pay. Perhaps the youth of
former student debtors contributes to their quite obviously
perceived deviance! (Here, there is an effect and cause relationship
between the preferential treatment being accorded to the Crown and
the shift in ideology (or the lobbying power of large creditors) that
forms the basis for the legislation.)
It is obvious to the authors of this article that though there were
positive elements to the 2009 reforms, much needs to occur in order
to create a bankruptcy system that is effective and fair, from both the
perspective of debtors and creditors. We therefore look forward to
future reforms, and particularly to those targeted at improving the
situation and options of low-income bankrupts. For poor bankrupts
have become the current "social and economic casualties of our
industrial and credit system." 97
97. Tasse Report, supra, footnote 7, at p. 54.
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